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LIVE AND LEARN: DEPOLITICIZING THE
INTERIM APPOINTMENTS OF U.S. ATTORNEYS
Laurie L. Levensont
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.'
I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. Attorneys play a special role in our federal criminal justice
system. As the representatives of the federal government, they have the
2responsibility of enforcing federal laws in their respective districts.
Although U.S. Attorneys serve "at the pleasure of the President," 3 the
goal is to have a fair and impartial prosecutor administering the laws.
4
The recent firing of eight U.S. Attorneys has called into question at-
tempts to politicize the role of this vital Office. By attempting to give
the Attorney General the power to make indefinite interim appointments,
I Professor of Law, William M. Rains Fellow & Director, Center for Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law
School. Thank you to John McKay, a man of true integrity, for inviting me to participate in the
Symposium at Seattle University School of Law. His courage, as well as that of his fellow U.S.
Attorneys, Paul Carlton, David Iglesias, Bill Cummins III, and Carol Lam, should serve as an inspi-
ration for others dedicated to public service. I also wish to extend my gratitude to the editors of the
Seattle University Law Review and to my wonderful research assistants, Emil Petrossian, Lindsay
Meurs, William Smyth, and Mary Gordon.
1. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
2. See generally Michael Edmund O'Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations:
An Empirical Analysis of Predicative Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439 (2004) (discussing fac-
tors U.S. Attorneys will use in making prosecutorial decisions for their districts).
3. Gonzales: '7 Serve at the Pleasure of the President," ABC NEWS, Mar. 14, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=2949749.
4. See Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court Ap-
pointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MrNN. L. REV. 363, 382-84 (2001) (discussing U.S. Attor-
neys' vast discretion to decide which crimes to prosecute and the consequential effect on Department
of Justice policy); see also infra Part II.
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the Justice Department has also compromised the independence of U.S.
Attorneys and their role as effective and fair federal prosecutors.
In 2006, something happened that jeopardized the role of U.S. At-
torneys like never before.5 Alberto Gonzales, then Attorney General of
the United States, authorized the midterm firings of eight experienced
and well-regarded U.S. Attorneys across the country. 6 With little or no
notice, these U.S. Attorneys were unceremoniously asked to leave their
posts. Interim U.S. Attorneys were appointed who generally lacked the
prosecutorial experience or credentials of the seasoned U.S. Attorneys
they replaced. 7  Shortly thereafter, Congress began investigating allega-
tions of political interference in the sacking of the U.S. Attorneys. 8
Currently, the investigation continues in order to discover who
called for the firing of these individuals and why. 9 Were they fired be-
cause they failed to indict members of the opposing political party? 10
Were they fired because they had the audacity to investigate and
indict members of the Administration's political party?" Who decided
5. Although there have been claims that U.S. Attorneys are routinely replaced, for reasons
explained in Part II of this Article, the Bush Administration's recent round of firings was
unprecedented. Scott Lilly, Attorney Scandal Without Precedent: CRS Reveals Audacity of
Dismissals, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, Mar. 20, 2007,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/03/crs-report.html; see also discussion infra Part Il.
6. Lilly, supra note 5.
7. For example, Bud Cummins of the Eastern District of Arkansas was dismissed in December
2006 and subsequently replaced by Timothy Griffin. Cummins was allegedly removed to "make
room" for Griffin, whose appointment was "important to Harriet [Miers], Karl [Rove], etc." Aaron
Sadler, Documents Shed New Light on Griffin Appointment, ARK. NEWS BUREAU, Mar. 14, 2007,
available at http://www.arkansasnews.com/archive/2007/03/14/WashingtonDCBureau/341041 .html.
Griffin's main qualification for the position as interim U.S. Attorney was his work as research
director for the Republican National Committee. As for legal experience, Griffin had served
in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Arkansas before his interim appointment. Conversely, Cummins
had served as a U.S. Attorney for five years before his dismissal and possessed a
much stronger legal background than Griffin. See Warwick Sabin, End Around: Senators Question
U.S. Attorney Appointment, ARK. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2006, at 10, available at
http://www.arktimes.com/Articles/ArticleViewer.aspx?ArticlelD=828918ba-6945-4db7-937c-
7aaa4efa6a3a. For a detailed discussion of the recent firings, see John McKay, Train Wreck at the
Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 265 (2008).
8. See Marisa Taylor, Political Interference Alleged in Sacking of a US. Attorney,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Feb. 28, 2007,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/marisa taylor/story/15683.html.
9. McKay, supra note 7, at 274. Investigations are being conducted by both the Senate and
House Judiciary committees, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, and the Office
of Professional Responsibility. Id.
10. Fired U.S. Attorney David Iglesias alleges that "he was dismissed for resisting pressure
from two members of Congress before last year's election to rush indictments in a Democratic kick-
back investigation." Jennifer Talhelm, Domenici Says He Called Fired Prosecutor, WASH. POST,
Mar. 5, 2007, at Al.
11. Carol Lam, former U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of California, notably spear-
headed the investigation and eventual conviction of "former 50th District U.S. Rep. Randy 'Duke'
Cunningham, who pleaded guilty in late 2005 to taking more than $2.4 million in bribes in exchange
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to put these individuals on the hit list? What was the overall goal of the
firings-to give party favorites an opportunity to pad their resumes with
the position of U.S. Attorney before the Administration's term came to
an end,12 or to fill a true need for new leadership in the U.S. Attorneys'
Offices?
The answers to these key questions are still unknown. Congress
remains frustrated by what it perceives to be a lack of candor by the for-
mer Attorney General 13 and his high-level deputies.1 4 Meanwhile, White
for steering tens of millions to defense contractors." William Finn Bennett, Issa to Testify on Lam's
Firing, NORTH COUNTY TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/03/06/news/topstories/1 01_443_5_07.txt. Some claim that
Lam's dismissal was brought on by her failure to prosecute smugglers of illegal immigrants. See id.
12. See Wiener, supra note 4.
13. Sen. Lincoln on Senate Floor. Bill Will Restore Constitutional Process of Confirming US.
Attorneys, U.S. FED. NEWS, March 19, 2007; Interview by Robert Siegel with Sen. Arlen Specter, in
Pa. (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/about/press/2007/032907.arlen.html; Keith
Koffler, Bush Expresses Support for Gonzales After Senate Grilling, NAT'L J., Apr. 20, 2007.
14. Many key figures have since submitted their resignations following the controversy of the
midterm firings. Former Deputy Attorney General McNulty submitted his resignation in May 2007,
citing personal reasons. No. 2 Official at Justice Department Resigns, CNN.COM, May 14, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/05/14/justice.mcnulty/index.html. McNulty came under scru-
tiny after testifying that the firings were performance-related, prompting many to claim the firings
were actually politically motivated. Id.
Kyle Sampson, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales's former chief of staff, is another
individual whose resignation centered on the controversy. After news surfaced that Sampson him-
self had drafted the plan to fire the attorneys, Sampson resigned in March 2007. Not only was
Sampson the architect behind the plan, but there were also findings that Sampson had been a likely
candidate for a vacant U.S. Attorney position in Utah, his home state. See Who's Who in the U.S.
Attorneys Case: Kyle Sampson, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-keyplayers07O3-26.html (follow "Next"
hyperlinks until reaching "Kyle Sampson") (last visited Aug. 13, 2007).
Former Attorney General Gonzales's former senior counsel and White House liaison Monica
Goodling resigned from her position after denying that she played any role in the firings. Evidence
suggests, however, that Goodling was a major player in discussions regarding several of the firings.
She eventually pleaded the Fifth Amendment when testifying in front of Congress. See id (follow
"Next" hyperlinks until reaching "Monica Goodling").
Yet another figure, Michael Battle, issued his resignation in March 2007. Battle served as the
messenger who informed the attorneys of their dismissal. He claimed that his resignation was unre-
lated to his role in the firings and had been in the works for some time. Although Battle was likely
not a decision-maker behind the firings, his responsibility as messenger and curiously timed resigna-
tion raised questions about his role in the firings. See David Johnston, Messenger in Prosecutors'
Firings Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at A14.
Finally, former Attorney General Gonzales himself resigned on August 27, 2007. Gonzales
did not offer any clear-cut reasons for his resignation. See Philip Shenon & David Johnston,
A Defender of Bush's Power, Gonzales Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at Al. Moreover,
commentators across the country were surprised by the timing of Gonzales's departure, given that he
had steadfastly refused to step down from his post weeks earlier during the height of public scrutiny
of the U.S. Attorneys scandal. See, e.g., Editorial, Gonzales Gone, and None Too Soon, ODESSA
AMERICAN, Aug. 29, 2007; Editorial, Gonzo: AG's Resignation Best for Country, THE
OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 28, 2007, at 6A. After Gonzales' resignation, the DOJ's inspector general,
Glenn Fine, initiated an investigation into "whether sworn statements to Congress by Attorney
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House officials have refused to testify, citing executive privilege.' 5 Still,
one thing is known: the method in place at the time of the firings for ap-
pointing interim U.S. Attorneys exacerbated the problem.' 6  Shortly be-
fore the firings, Congress reauthorized the Patriot Act, 17 which included
a provision that shifted the power to make long-term interim appoint-
ments from the Chief Judge of a district to the Attorney General.' 8 This
change, which went unnoticed at the time, 19 gave the Administration the
ability to bypass the Senate confirmation process and to put in place its
own political choices for interim U.S. Attorneys. Although the Admini-
stration claimed that the change was needed for national security pur-
poses,2° its effect was to add to the increasing politicization of U.S.
General Alberto Gonzales were 'intentionally false, misleading or inappropriate."' Philip Shenon,
U.S. Watchdog Is Investigating Gonzales, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 1, 2007, at 2. The investiga-
tion continues today, and Gonzales has retained private counsel to assist him with the government's
probe. See Marisa McQuilken, Gonzales'Man in White, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at 3.
15. In fact, in July 2007, President Bush actually ordered his adviser and former White House
counsel Harriet Miers not to testify in front of Congress. Miers is said to have suggested a plan to
fire all U.S. Attorneys back in 2005. The Administration claims that Miers is immune from the
subpoena, while Democrats claim that she no longer enjoys the immunity she maintained during her
employment at the White House. Another woman, White House political director Sara Taylor, ini-
tially refused to answer any questions regarding President Bush's role in the firings, but later said
that Bush played no role whatsoever. The House Judiciary Committee later voted to issue Miers a
contempt of Congress citation. David Stout & Jim Rutenberg, Bush Instructs His
Ex-Counsel Not to Appear at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/1 I/washington/I lend-
attorneys.html?ex=l 187150400&en=ea26c3bbl 6f592e4&ei=5070; see also Jennifer Yachnin, Con-
tempt Votes to Wait Until Fall, ROLL CALL, July 26, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 14304063.
16. This procedure was subsequently abandoned following the uproar caused by the dismissal
of the eight U.S. Attorneys and their replacement with interim U.S. Attorneys appointed by the At-
torney General. See Michael Posner, Senate Judiciary Panel Revises Rule for U.S. Attorneys, CON-
GRESS DAILY, Feb. 8, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2570450.
17. The new Patriot Act, titled the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act, was
passed March 9, 2006. See CHARLES DOYLE & BRIAN T. YEH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, USA PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(2006), available at htp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf.
18. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 502,
120 Stat. 192, 246 (2006).
19. Senator Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.) stated that the measure that allowed the Administration to
appoint U.S. Attorneys for an indefinite period of time went unnoticed as the fight for the passage of
bill went on for months. Feinstein asserted that Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) had "slipped in" the
measure in such a way that no one knew it was in the bill. Specter, however, vehemently denied
doing so. In fact, Specter stated that he was unaware of the provision until it was brought to his
attention by Senator Feinstein. Also, Specter said that the provision was open for inspection for
more than three months. Paul Kiel, Specter: "I Do Not Slip Things In," TPM.cOM, Feb. 6, 2007,
http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/002487.php.
20. Before signing the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act (the Act), the Presi-
dent addressed the need to enact this piece of legislation in order to win the war on terror and protect
the American people. The President asserted that the Act would strengthen national security by
allowing authorized law enforcement and intelligence officers to share vital information and by
allowing agents to track terrorists with the same tools they use against other criminals. Press
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Attorneys' Offices. 2 1 Both Republicans and Democrats quickly agreed
that the new law was a bad choice and sought to amend it.
22
It was not by accident that the power to appoint interim U.S. Attor-
neys was shifted from judges to U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) offi-
cials. In 2001, a trial attorney of the DOJ, Ross E. Wiener, had proposed
the change. In his article, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Inde-
pendent Counsel. Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 23 Wie-
ner proposed that the power to appoint interim U.S. Attorneys shift from
the Judicial to the Executive Branch.24 To his credit, he did suggest ways
in which Congress could have some oversight in the appointment proc-
ess.25 None of these, however, were put in place when the Patriot Act
was passed.
Following the U.S. Attorney purge of 2006-2007, it is time to reas-
sess the approach used to appoint interim U.S. Attorneys. Recent events
have taught us how quickly U.S. Attorneys can become political pawns.
Indeed, this scandal has jeopardized the credibility of federal prosecu-
tors, disillusioned career prosecutors in those positions, and called into
question the separation between professionalism and politics in the
Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Signs USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthori-
zation Act (Mar. 9, 2006) (on file with author).
21. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Dept. of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and
Firing of U.S. Attorneys?, Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Laurie L. Levenson, Professor, Loyola Law School) [hereinafter Levenson, Preserving Prosecuto-
rial Independence] (explaining that "[u]nder the present system, the Executive Branch can-and
appears determined to-bypass the confirmation role of the Senate by making indefinite interim
appointments. The result is a system where political favorites may be appointed without any oppor-
tunity for the Senate to evaluate those candidates' backgrounds and qualifications to serve as the
chief federal law enforcement officer of their districts.").
22. The USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act was signed by President George
W. Bush on March 9th, 2006. Posner, supra note 16.
23. Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court Ap-
pointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MrNN L. REV. 363 (2001).
24. Id. at 445. This article suggests that partisan political instincts of U.S Attorneys need to be
kept in check. In order to do so, the President and Congress must fulfill their constitutionally pre-
scribed roles. The appointment of U.S. Attorneys is an executive function and should reside with the
executive branch. Id. Congress, however, should have the power to affect the appointment of interim
U.S. Attorneys and to force the executive to make a decision in a timely fashion. Id. Congress also
has the power to make sure that qualified prosecutors take the responsibilities of a U.S. Attorney
during a vacancy. Id. at 446. By having oversight over the appointment of qualified attorneys,
Congress has provided the incentive to the Executive Branch to nominate an acceptable candidate
for the position. Id. Intense congressional oversight will provide cooperation with the Executive
Branch. Id.
25. Id. at 443. For example, Wiener suggests that Congress edit the laws so that the Executive
Branch must appoint an interim U.S. Attorney from among the career prosecutors in the local U.S.
Attorney's office. Id. Wiener makes other suggestions that are not as practical, such as having
Senate-appointed officials oversee the U.S. Attorneys' offices themselves when there is a vacancy.
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enforcement of our federal laws.26 To restore confidence in U.S. Attor-
neys' Offices, a reexamination of the interim appointment process is
critical so that the mistakes of 2006 are not repeated.
Part II of this Article discusses the important role of U.S. Attorneys
and why their function is threatened by a growing politicization of the
U.S. Attorney's Office. Part III explains how U.S. Attorneys have tradi-
tionally been appointed, and why the shift from the traditional approach
to one that affords more power to the Executive Branch was unwarranted
and unwise. Finally, Part IV proposes an approach that will better ensure
that only qualified individuals serve in the position of U.S. Attorney and
will stem the tide toward politicization of the office.
The last two years have been a dark period for federal prosecutors.
The Attorney General was accused of being a liar, an incompetent leader,
or both;27 the accusations were ultimately enough to force his resigna-
tion.28 Dedicated public servants have found their names dragged
26. See Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Attorney General Held Firm on War Policies, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at Al ("Many say [former Attorney General Gonzales] leaves a Justice De-
partment that has been tainted by political influence, depleted by the departures of top officials and
weakened by sapped morale."); Philip Shenon & Jim Rutenberg, Justice Dept. Lawyers Join Chorus
Criticizing Gonzales, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007, at AlI ("Daniel J. Metcalfe, a lawyer who began
his government career in the Nixon administration and retired from the Justice Department last win-
ter, said morale at the department was worse under [former Attorney General Gonzales] than during
Watergate .... Even though they worry that it may hinder their career prospects, a few current and
former Justice Department lawyers have begun to add to the chorus of Mr. Gonzales's critics who
say that the furor over his performance as attorney general, and questions about his truthfulness
under oath, could do lasting damage to the department's work. It is a view that is widely shared on
Capitol Hill .... ").
27. Editorial, The Gonzales Soap Opera, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 1, 2007, at 18; Commen-
tary, Mr. Gonzales'Amnesia, HARTFORD COURANT, July 29, 2007, at C2.
28. See Tom Brune & Carol Eisenberg, Gonzales Resigns: Who's Next in Line?, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 28, 2007, at A8; Philip Shenon & David Johnston, A Defender of Bush's Power, Gonzales
Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at Al. Commenting on Gonzales' resignation, Sen. Leahy
stated that
[u]nder this Attorney General and this President, the Department of Justice suffered a se-
vere crisis of leadership that allowed our justice system to be corrupted by political influ-
ence. It is a shame, and it is the Justice Department, the American people and the dedi-
cated professionals of our law enforcement community who have suffered most from it.
The obligations of the Justice Department and its leaders are to the Constitution, the
rule of law and the American people, not to the political considerations of this or any
White House. The Attorney General's resignation reinforces what Congress and the
American people already know-that no Justice Department should be allowed to be-
come a political arm of the White House, whether occupied by a Republican or a
Democrat.
The troubling evidence revealed about this massive breach is a lesson to those in the
future who hold these high offices, so that law enforcement is never subverted in this way
again. I hope the Attorney General's decision will be a step toward getting to the truth
about the level of political influence this White House wields over the Department of Jus-
tice and toward reconstituting its leadership so that the American people can renew their
faith in its role as our leading law enforcement agency.
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through the mud as DOJ officials have tried to justify their firings.2 9 Ca-
reer prosecutors have been demoralized because the scandal has cast a
shadow on the integrity and professionalism of federal prosecutors gen-
erally.3 0  Most importantly, the public has had to wonder whether re-
placement U.S. Attorneys are bound to serve the public's interests or
merely their own. It is bad enough to live through this period; it is even
worse if we do not learn from it. The appointment of interim U.S. Attor-
neys should not be a political game. Rather, it should be a process that
recognizes that the first and foremost responsibility for prosecutors is "to
do justice.'
II. THE ROLE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS
U.S. Attorneys, through their power to "prosecute for all offenses
against the United States,, 32 are the chief law enforcement officials of
the federal districts. They have the discretion to decide which cases to
pursue and how to allocate resources in order to best serve the priorities
Comment of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm., on Reports of the Resigna-
tion of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (Aug. 27, 2007), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200708/082707.html.
29. Editorial, Dropping Like Flies, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 25, 2007, at Bl0 ("U.S. Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales denied [that] political motives figured in the multiple resignations of top
prosecutors, and pledged that all interim appointments would be submitted to the Senate for confir-
mation."); Mark Folman, Inside Bush's Prosecutor Purge, SALON, Feb. 28, 2005,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/02/28/attomeys/ ("Justice Department leaders have vigor-
ously denied that the firings were politically motivated.").
30. Jay Ambrose, Gonzales: Victim or Lickspittle?, CINCINNATI POST, Aug. 30, 2007, at A;
Massimo Calabresi & Brian Bennett, The Gonzales Legacy, TIME, Sept. 10, 2007, at 40 ("[T]he
scandal and its clumsy handling resulted in the resignations of more than half a dozen top officials at
the [Justice Department] and demoralized prosecutors throughout the system."); Levenson, Preserv-
ing Prosecutorial Independence, supra note 21 ("Asking qualified U.S. Attorneys to leave and re-
placing them with political insiders is demoralizing; it denigrates the work of hardworking and dedi-
cated Assistant U.S. Attorneys and undermines public confidence in the work of their offices."). See
generally Randall D. Eliason, Editorial, Justice Suffers When It's Political, BALTIMORE SUN, May
29, 2007, at 9A ("The next time a defendant claims that the prosecution's case is simply political, the
public-and the jury-may be more receptive. Who could blame them for believing the defendant
may have been indicted in order to influence an election?").
31. Circuit Judge Stephen S. Trott, when he was Assistant Attorney General, phrased it this
way:
As officials charged with upholding all the laws of the land, the Constitution is our sacred
trust. I am confident that we shall avail ourselves of this opportunity to demonstrate
without ambiguity to the Supreme Court and to the American people that we are fully ca-
pable of discharging this duty.
Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, The Challenge to Law Enforcement of the Reasonable
Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, Address delivered before the Career Prosecutor
Course of the National College of District Attorneys (July 5, 1984) (transcript on file with the
author); see also Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553 (1998).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2000).
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of their respective jurisdictions.33 Every year, U.S. Attorneys file thou-
sands of cases. 34 Some of the more notable cases in the last decade in-
clude terrorism cases: 35 the prosecutions of Timothy McVeigh, 36 Martha
Stewart, 37 Scooter Libby38 as well as other celebrity cases. 39  By both
tradition and function, U.S. Attorneys serve as DOJ employees but main-
tain the independence necessary to serve the needs of their districts.
40
Although U.S. Attorneys' Offices are financially supported by the
DOJ and rely on the DOJ for coordination and direction, the Offices are
separate from the DOJ.41 Historically, U.S. Attorneys have enjoyed at
33. See EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR U.S. ATT'YS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATr'Ys ANN. STAT.
REP. 1 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/readingroom/reports/asr2006/O6statrpt.pdf
("Each United States Attorney is responsible for establishing law enforcement priorities within his or
her district"); see also O'Neill, supra note 2, at 1486.
34. During 2004, 126,878 suspects were arrested by Federal law enforcement agencies for
violations of Federal law. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cfjs04.htm. In 2005,
91,578 defendants were charged in felony or misdemeanor cases. See generally id; Federal Justice
Statistics Resource Center, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://fjsrc.urban.org.
35. See generally Richard Willing, FBI Cases Drop as It Focuses on Terror, USA TODAY,
Apr. 13, 2006, at IA (noting that non-terrorism-related prosecutions dropped as there was an in-
crease in terrorism cases).
36. Timothy McVeigh was responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168
people and was the deadliest act of terrorism in the United States until the September 11 th attacks.
Jo Thomas, Agony Relived as U.S. Pursues McVeigh Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1997, at Al.
37. Martha Stewart was involved in an insider trading scandal and was convicted of fraud,
conspiracy, and obstruction ofjustice. See Brooke A. Masters, Stewart Attorney Asks for Prosecu-
tion Papers, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2004, at E2.
38. Scooter Libby served as Assistant to President Bush, Chief of Staff to Vice President Che-
ney, and Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs from 2001 to 2005. Libby
resigned his government positions after his indictment on five felony counts in the grand jury inves-
tigation into the disclosure of the then-classified identity of covert CIA operative Valerie E. Wilson
(Mrs. Joseph C. Wilson), also known as Valerie Plame. See Amy Goldstein & Carol D. Leonnig,
Prosecution Rests Case in Libby's Perjury Trial, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2007, at A3; see also Cla-
rence Page, Fuzzy Justice Clearly Stinks; Bush Commutation of Libby Prison Term Flies in Face of
Precedent, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 2007, at C15.
39. Bill Hutchinson, Lil' More Venom in Jail, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 28, 2005, at 16 (discuss-
ing rapper Lil' Kim's 366 day sentence for lying before a grand jury).
40. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, "The U.S. Attorneys Scandal" and the Allocation
of Prosecutorial Power (Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 1015026, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=l 015026 (detailing the allocation of prosecu-
torial power and the role of independence in the work of U.S. Attorneys).
Professor James Eisenstein has written the seminal book on the role of U.S. Attorneys and their
role in federal law enforcement. See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED
STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS (1978) [hereinafter EISENSTEIN,
COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES]. His article in this Issue further describes the nature of the
relationship between U.S. Attorneys and the main Department of Justice. See James Eisenstein, The
US. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice's Centralization Efforts in Historical Context, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 219 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings].
41. O'Neill, supra note 2, at 1486; see also Green & Zacharias, supra note 40, at 1 (noting that
Attorney General Robert H. Jackson had agreed that "some measure of centralized control is
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least some independence with respect to job performance. In fact, the
independence of the office is rooted in its very creation. Both the Office
of the United States Attorney and the position of United States Attorney
General were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789.42 The 1789 Act pro-
vided for the appointment
in each district of a meet person learned in the law to act as attorney
for the United States ... whose duty it shall be to prosecute in each
district all delinquents for crimes and offenses, recognizable under
the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the
United States shall be concerned.43
At the outset, the Attorney General was "more of a general attorney
than an officer statutorily empowered to command other governmental
attorneys." 44 The Attorney General did not have power to appoint U.S.
Attorneys and had no control over them. 45 It was not until August of
1861 that Congress passed an act giving the Attorney General authority
over U.S. Attorneys by delegating powers of "general superintendence
and direction duties" to the Attorney General. 46 Although the "superin-
tendence" powers were not specified at that time, the Attorney General
later received the power to supervise criminal and civil proceedings in
any district through the Department of Justice Act of June 22, 1870 and
the Act of June 30, 1906. 47 The primary means of supervising U.S. At-
torneys was to adopt policies that guided the U.S. Attorneys in their dis-
cretionary decisions.48
necessary" to ensure that U.S. Attorneys are consistent in their interpretation and applications of the
law but that their judgment should not be overruled except in unusual cases).
42. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92 (1789); see Henry J. Bourguignon, The Federal Key to the
Judiciary Act of1789, 46 S.C. L. REV. 647 (1995); Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421 (1989); Sandra
Day O'Connor, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the American Judicial Tradition, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. I
(1990).
43. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 3-2.110 (1997) (quoting Judiciary Act
of 1789, 1 Stat. 92) [hereinafter MANUAL], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usarn/.
44. Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 552 (2005).
45. James R. Harvey 111, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Representa-
tion ofAgency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1578 (1996).
46. MANUAL, supra note 43, at § 3-2.110 (quoting Act of Aug. 2, 1861, Ch. 37, 12 Stat. 185
(1861)).
47. Id. As noted by Professors Green and Zacharias, while the establishment of the Depart-
ment of Justice gave the Attorney General the legal authority to oversee U.S. Attorneys (known as
"district attorneys" at that time), there were practical limits on the Attorney General performing
under this rule because of the complexities of travel and communications in that early era. "Early
U.S. Attorneys had to function relatively autonomously." See Green & Zacharias, supra note 40 at
10.
48. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 40, at 10.
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Today, U.S. Attorneys are considered "officers" of the United
States. An officer is defined as "any appointee exercising significant au-
thority pursuant to the laws of the United States. '49 Because the Attor-
ney General has supervisory power over them, U.S. Attorneys are classi-
fied as inferior, rather than principal, officers of the Executive.5 ° The
Attorney General has "plenary authority" over U.S. Attorneys and "un-
fettered discretion to reassign cases from United States Attorneys to her-
self or to 'any officer of the Department of Justice."' 51  The Attorney
General also establishes the salaries of U.S. Attorneys.52  This power
gives the Attorney General significant and practical control over U.S.
Attorneys.53
Nevertheless, U.S. Attorneys are not merely employees of the At-
torney General. 28 U.S.C. § 541 creates a limit on the Attorney General's
power over U.S. Attorneys. It provides that U.S. Attorneys will be ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.54
Each U.S. Attorney is appointed to each judicial district for a four-year
term and each attorney is subject to removal only by the President.55
Once the four-year term expires, the U.S. Attorney continues to serve
until a successor is appointed and approved.56 Currently, there are
49. U.S. v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976)). In Gantt, the defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from her hotel room on the
ground that the police failed to issue a complete copy of the search warrant. See Gantt, 194 F.3d at
999. The government failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which limits the right of appeal on
criminal cases. Id. at 996-97. The defendant argued that the untimely certification was invalid
because the appointment of the then-United States Attorney for the Southern District of California
by the judges of the Southern District of California, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 546(d), violated the
Appointments Clause. Id. at 998. The court held that (1) the govemment's failure to timely comply
with certification requirements did not warrant dismissal of the appeal; (2) United States Attorneys
are "inferior officers," so their appointment by the district court did not violate the Appointments
Clause; (3) the failure to give defendant, who was present during the search, a complete copy of the
search warrant justified suppression of the evidence; and (4) the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule was inapplicable. See id.
50. ld. at 999.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1000.
53. The DOJ also maintains regulations that require approval for certain types of prosecutions
and on major policy questions, such as whether to subpoena a lawyer or to seek the death penalty.
See MANUAL, supra note 43, §§ 9-2.400, 9-10.040.
54. 28 U.S.C § 541 (2006). The statute reads as follows:
United States attorneys: (a) The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, a United States attorney for each judicial district; (b) Each United
States attorney shall be appointed for a term of four years. On the expiration of his term,
a United States attorney shall continue to perform the duties of his office until his succes-
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ninety-three U.S. Attorneys stationed throughout the United States and
its territories; one U.S. Attorney is appointed to each judicial district,
with the exception of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, which
share a single U.S. Attorney.
57
The Attorney General retains the ability to supervise the duties of
the U.S. Attorneys and any litigation to which the United States is a
party. 58 U.S. Attorneys possess powers enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 547;
these enumerated powers include the ability to:
(1) [P]rosecute for all offenses against the United States; (2) prose-
cute or defend, for the government, all civil actions, suits, or pro-
ceedings in which the United States is concerned; (3) appear in be-
half of the defendants in all civil actions, suits or proceedings pend-
ing in [sic] [the] district against collectors, or other officers of the
revenue or customs for any act done by them or for the recovery of
any money exacted by or paid to such officers, and by them paid
into the Treasury; (4) institute and prosecute proceedings for the
collection of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred for violation
of any revenue law, unless satisfied upon investigation that justice
does not require such proceedings; and (5) make such reports as the
Attorney General shall direct.
59
Given this authority, the Attorney General works with the U.S. Attorneys
in much the same way the General Counsel of a company may outsource
or retain outside litigation counsel to bring or defend cases.
The vast majority of the cases handled by U.S. Attorneys are crimi-
nal prosecutions.6 ° In criminal cases in which the United States is a
party, U.S. Attorneys are the "principal federal law enforcement officers
in their judicial districts.' U.S. Attorneys have the authority to desig-
nate an Assistant U.S. Attorney who would, in the absence of the U.S.
57. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATT'ys MISSION STATEMENT, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ (last
visited Sept. 1, 2007). There are currently fifteen interim U.S. Attorneys (not appointed by the
President). It is unusual for U.S. Attorneys to leave their posts before their terms expire. Between
1981 and 2006, there have been fifty-four U.S. Attorneys who have left before their respective terms
were over. Of these fifty-four, only two were dismissed and only six resigned. See KEVIN M.
SCOTT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE SERVED LESS THAN
FULL FOUR-YEAR TERMS, 1981-2006, (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/USAttorneys/ServingLessThan4Years.pdf.
58. MANUAL, supra note 43, § 3-2.140.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
60. In 2006, 72,196 defendants were charged in federal criminal cases, the majority of whom
were charged with either drug trafficking or immigration-related offenses. Federal Justice Statistics
Resource Center, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://fjsrc.urban.org/fjs.cfm?p=statisticsabout&t=c
(last visited Aug. 13, 2007).
61. MANUAL, supra note 43, § 3-2.140.
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Attorney, perform his or her superior's duties.62 Generally, Assistant
U.S. Attorneys work at the direction of the U.S. Attorney and have infre-
quent contact with other DOJ officials unless the DOJ and local federal
prosecutors jointly handle a case.63 As one former U.S. Attorney
quipped, "[a] good U.S. Attorney's Office . .. is usually much better
equipped to handle a complex criminal prosecution than the young trial
attorneys from the Department of Justice, who travel around the country,
primarily because they are looking for courtroom experience. 64
U.S. Attorneys use their discretion to decide which cases will be
prosecuted; they essentially execute their role as the chief federal law
enforcement officials for their districts. 65  Moreover, they have an inde-
pendent legal and ethical responsibility to ensure that laws are being
properly executed.66 As a result, neutrality and independence are
62. MANUAL, supra note 43, § 3-2.150. The U.S. Attorney ordinarily appoints the Chief Assis-
tant or First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the office to serve in this position. See 28 U.S.C. § 542
(2006); see also MANUAL, supra note 43, § 3-2.200.
63. For example, DOJ attorneys will frequently help in specialized prosecutions such as civil
rights violations. A good example is the prosecution of four police officers for violating black mo-
torist Rodney King's constitutional rights. After a state court acquitted the four officers of use-of-
excessive-force and assault charges, a federal court convicted two of those officers, Lawrence Pow-
ell and Stacey Koon, of civil rights violations. The federal prosecution was likely fueled by the riots
that occurred after the state court acquittals. See generally Laurie L. Levenson, Special Issue: The
Rodney King Trials: Civil Rights Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy: The Future of State and Fed-
eral Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509 (1994).
Typically, complaints against police officers are handled by internal police investigators;
criminal prosecutions are referred to the District Attorney's Office. When police misconduct is at
issue, federal prosecutors usually defer to local authorities because they want local authorities to
have the opportunity to deal with local issues. Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) investigates civil rights violations and, as was the case with the Rodney King incident, often
conducts its investigations simultaneously with those of local law enforcement. The FBI may also
begin investigations after a referral by local authorities. Once the FBI concludes its investigation, it
will refer the matter to the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ. The DOJ will then assign a federal
prosecutor from Washington, D.C. to the case, along with a local federal prosecutor from the district
in which the offense occurred. See id.
Advantages of federal prosecutions of civil rights violations include the ability and time to
conduct more thorough investigations. In the Rodney King case, the federal prosecutors held a clear
advantage over their state counterparts because they had the opportunity to learn from the state's
mistakes, and thus present a more compelling case. See id.
64. WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, JR.: AN INSIDE VIEW OF 'JUSTICE' IN AMERICA UNDER THE
NIXON ADMINISTRATION 48 (1975); see also ELSENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITES STATES, supra
note 40 (describing the nature of relationships between U.S. Attorneys and the DOJ as an "undercur-
rent of tension and subdued hostility").
65. O'Neill, supra note 2, at 1486 ("It is a practical reality that U.S. Attorneys operate fairly
independently of DOJ headquarters in Washington, D.C. While the Attorney General may be the
titular head of federal law enforcement efforts, individual U.S. Attorneys possess their own political
power base, are not directly accountable to the Attorney General, and may be swayed by the needs
of the communities in which they serve.") (footnote omitted).
66. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-93 (1988) (discussing the need for independence
from the Executive in order to prevent coercive influence); see also United States v. Hilario, 218
F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000). U.S. Attorneys, as officers of the court, have a special responsibility to
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essential to U.S. Attorneys' abilities to effectively perform their job du-
ties.67 Robert Jackson, former Attorney General and former Supreme
Court Justice, stated that "[t]he prosecutor has more control over life,
liberty, and reputation than any other person in America. His discretion
is tremendous. 68 Provided with such power, a prosecutor must practice
in a way that is neutral and non-partisan. It would be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, for U.S. Attorneys to be completely fair if they were
being influenced by a political entity.69  Indeed, a lawyer cannot effec-
tively do his or her job if there is such a conflict of interest.
70
Political influences create a problem when they involve U.S. At-
torneys. Attorneys who are not independent of such influences may feel
compelled to act in a biased manner.71  For example, political pressures
ensure that justice is served. Accordingly, they must refrain from making claims that are not sup-
ported in law or fact or that do not include a good faith argument regarding an existing law. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1997). Former Attorney General and former Supreme Court
Justice Robert H. Jackson discussed in a speech the ethical responsibility of U.S. Attorneys. Due to
the tremendous control U.S. Attorneys have over citizens, U.S. Attorneys must exercise judgment
that is fair and, most importantly, non-political. Lincoln Caplan, What's Really Wrong With the Bush
Justice Department, SLATE, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2161804/; see also Laurie L.
Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 559 (1999) (the public prosecutor should be guided in her discretionary
decisions "by an honest effort to discern public needs and community concerns .... Morally, prose-
cutors must consider whether a conviction is 'consistent with the public interest,' in conjunction with
their personal sense of the defendant's culpability for the crime .... "). For excellent articles dis-
cussing prosecutors' ethical duties in making charges, see Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard
for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513 (1993); Bruce
A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice?, " 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J 607 (1999); H. Richard
Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest for an Ethical Standard. Guidance from the ABA, 71
MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1973); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Prac-
tice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991).
67. MANUAL, supra note 43, at § 3-2.140 ("In the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion,
United States Attorneys construe and implement the policy of the Department of Justice. Their pro-
fessional abilities and the need for their impartiality in administering justice directly affect the pub-
lic's perception of federal law enforcement.").
68. See Caplan, supra note 66 (quoting Attorney General Robert Jackson, Attorney General of
the United States, Address at Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, (1940), in 24 J.
AM. JUD. SoC'Y 18 (Apr. 1, 1940)).
69. See Caplan, supra note 66 (quoting Attorney General Robert Jackson, Attorney General of
the United States, Address at Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, (1940), in 24 J.
AM. JUD. SOC'Y 18 (Apr. 1, 1940)).
70. Eric R. Glitzenstein & Alan B. Morrison, A Symposium on Morrison v. Olson: Addressing
the Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Statute: The Supreme Court's Decision in Morrison
v. Olson: A Common Sense Application of the Constitution to a Practical Problem, 38 AM. U. L.
REV. 359, 379-82 (1989).
71. Id. at 379; see Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What's Politics Got to Do
With It?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 751-56 (2005) (discussing range of political influences on
prosecutors). Although it may be impossible for prosecutors to remain completely neutral, some
influences, such as prosecutors bowing to partisan political powers, are more pernicious than others.
See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WiS. L. REV. 837, 858-59
(2004) (prosecutors should avoid party politics); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS
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may cause prosecutors to pursue prosecutions against political opponents
or to fail to investigate violations by members of their own political
party.72 Moreover, appointments made by a party with an interest in a
case will, at the very least, allow for conflicts to arise and for impropriety
to appear.73 Often, prosecutors must face the question of whether to
bring charges against an individual. However, they will not be able to
make fair judgments if they are afraid of being reprimanded for certain
types of decisions, like whether to bring charges against elected offi-
cials.74 Based on these influences, prosecutors may decide to bring
charges against individuals when charges are not warranted, or fail to
bring charges when they are. This lack of independence from bias and
undue influence threatens the fairness of the criminal justice system. 75
Prosecutorial independence is necessary to assure the public that
justice is being served. Independence allows U.S. Attorneys to serve as
impartial decision makers better able to serve justice. If a prosecutor acts
based on motives other than the search for truth and the administration of
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 9 (3d ed. 1993) ("[A]
prosecutor should not allow . .. ideological or political beliefs to interfere with the professional
performance of official duties.").
72. For instance, David Iglesias, one of the prosecutors ousted during the U.S. Attorneys scan-
dal, claimed that he was terminated because he did not pursue charges against various Democrats for
alleged voter fraud preceding the 2006 congressional elections. Michael Kranish & Susan Milligan,
Gonzales Resigns Probes Will Continue: Democrats Pledge to Pursue Facts on US Attorney Fir-
ings, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 2007, at IA. Many believed that Daniel Bogden, another casualty of
the U.S. attorney firings, lost his job because, among other things, his office had indicted a Reno
doctor with political ties to the Republican party, initiated an investigation of a Republican con-
gressman's fundraising efforts, and raided the home of a businessman with close ties to a Republican
gubernatorial candidate. Lisa Mascaro, I'd Given Up on Gonzales Leaving, Bogden Says: Ousted
U.S. Attorney Reveals More, Tells of Losing Faith in Justice, LAS VEGAS SUN, Aug. 28, 2007, at A].
See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 40, at 16-17 & nn.83-86.
73. Glitzenstein and Morrison, supra note 70, at 380 (discussing court appointments of attor-
neys).
74. U.S. Attorney Carol Lam's story is instructive in this regard. Lam was the U.S. Attorney in
the Southern District of California, having been appointed to the post by President Bush in 2002.
Lam was purportedly asked to resign because of supposed "job performance issues" related to her
unwillingness to make smuggling, gun, and border-crossing cases top priorities of her department.
See Eric Lipton & David Johnston, Justice Dept. Announces Inquiry into Its Hiring Practices, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A]8; Kelly Thornton & Onell R. Soto, Lam Is Asked to Step Down: Job
Performance Said to Be Behind White House Firing, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 12, 2007, at Al.
Many believe, however, that Lam was asked to resign because of her high-profile bribery prosecu-
tion of Randall "Duke" Cunningham, a former Republican congressman. See, e.g., Editorial, A
Scandal That Keeps Growing, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, at 413; Lipton & Johnston, supra (stated
justifications for dismissal of U.S. attorneys not credible). See generally Thornton & Soto, supra
(discussing the Cunningham prosecution). As a result, some prosecutors may have perceived Lam's
forced resignation as symbolizing a message from the powers-that-be to refrain from prosecuting
elected officials, particularly those within the Republican party.
75. Thomas Heffelfinger, Something is Fundamentally Broken Within the Department of
Justice, THE HENNEPIN LAWYER, June 27, 2007, available at
http://hennepin.timberlakepublishing.com/article.asp?article=l 142&paper =I &cat = 147.
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justice, the integrity and effectiveness of the criminal justice system is
compromised.76
The manner in which U.S. Attorneys are appointed, especially in-
terim U.S. Attorneys, can affect their independence and the public's per-
ception of their integrity. If there is a thorough and transparent screening
of a prospective U.S. Attorney's credentials, then there will likely be
greater public confidence in the appointment. If there is oversight of the
appointment, there is an additional check that the appointee will commit
to the fair administration of justice over his or her personal and political
interests. As recent events have demonstrated procedural changes, like
those discussed in detail in the next Part of this Article, can make all the
difference in whether the public respects or is suspicious of federal law
enforcement, U.S. Attorneys, and the DOJ.
III. APPOINTMENT PROCESS OF INTERIM U.S. ATTORNEYS
An appointment process for interim U.S. Attorneys is necessary be-
cause vacant U.S. Attorney positions are not unusual.77 U.S. Attorneys
leave for a variety of reasons, often to make more money or
advance their careers.78  Not surprisingly, a significant number of U.S.
Attorneys leave for appointment to the federal bench.79
Although it is not unusual for U.S. Attorneys to leave their posts,
it is rare for them to be fired. A study conducted by the Congressional
Research Service found that from 1981-2006, no more than three of the
486 U.S. Attorneys who served during that time span were fired.80 When
a U.S. Attorney was terminated, it was only under the most extreme of
76. Id.
77. As of March 29, 2007, there were eighteen open U.S. Attorney posts open. David Welna,
Senate Bypassed Many Key Justice Jobs, NPR, Mar. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9204310.
78. Approximately fifty-four U.S. Attorneys left office before the completion of their four-year
term between 1981 and 2006. This figure does not include those whose tenure was interrupted by a
change in the presidential administration.
Of those 54, 17 left to become Article III federal judges, one left to become a federal
magistrate judge, six left to serve in other positions in the executive branch, four sought
elective office, two left to serve in state government, one died, and 15 left to enter or re-
turn to private practice. Of the remaining eight U.S. attorneys who left before completing
a four-year term without a change in presidential administration, two were apparently
dismissed by the President, and three apparently resigned after news reports indicated
they had engaged in questionable personal actions. No information was available on the
three remaining U.S. attorneys who resigned.
Scott, supra note 57, Summary. For a more general discussion of the motivations of federal prose-
cutors in joining and leaving public service, see Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea
Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2005).
79. See Scott, supra note 57, at 5.
80. See id at 6.
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circumstances. For example, U.S. Attorney William Kennedy was ap-
pointed by President Reagan and dismissed by the President in 1982.1
He was dismissed for charging that the DOJ was blocking his attempt to
prosecute a key CIA informant. 82  Another U.S. Attorney, J. William
Petro, was dismissed by the President in 1984 for disclosing information
from an undercover operation about a pending indictment, which later
reached the subject of the investigation.
83
In addition, from 1981-2006, only three U.S. Attorneys resigned as
a result of questionable conduct. The questionable conduct included
grabbing a television reporter by the throat, biting a topless dancer on the
arm during a visit to an adult club, and accusing a predecessor of smok-
ing marijuana while at the same time admitting to using the drug him-
self.
8 4
The circumstances surrounding these firings and resignations are
very different from those surrounding the recent firings by the Bush Ad-
ministration. Not only were eight active U.S. Attorneys fired at ap-
proximately the same time,85 but there were no allegations of serious
misconduct cited at the time as the reasons for the firings. It is fair to say
that the recent terminations were unprecedented.8 6 Unlike prior Presi-
dents that have asked U.S. Attorneys to resign so they can make their
own appointments when their respective administrations take power,8
7
President Bush fired eight U.S. Attorneys during their terms of service
and without identifying any specific misconduct that would have justi-
fied the terminations.
88
When a U.S. Attorney's post becomes vacant, an interim U.S. At-
torney must be appointed. The Department of Justice will often look to




84. See Scott, supra note 57, at 6-7.
85. Richard B. Schmitt, The Nation: Bush Refuses to Cooperate in Probe of Attorney Firings,
L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at A9.
86. See Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 40, at 234 (recent firings of U.S. Attor-
neys were "unprecedented and counter to a long-standing and widespread consensus that they could
expect to continue to serve until they either left voluntarily or at the end of an administration").
87. Mass firings are not unusual at the beginning of a new presidential administration. Tradi-
tionally, Presidents dismiss nearly all U.S. Attorneys upon entering office. For example, President
Reagan dismissed seventy-one of the ninety-three U.S. Attorneys in his first year of office. Presi-
dent Clinton appointed eighty new U.S Attorneys in his first year of office. Department of Justice,
U.S. Attorneys Offices, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/offices/index.html.
88. Later, President Bush refused to cooperate with investigations into the firings by citing
executive privilege. Richard B. Schmitt, The Nation: Bush Refuses to Cooperate in Probe ofAttor-
ney Firings, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at A9.
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an interim basis. 89 If the Chief Assistant is unable or unwilling to do so,
other senior staff members will be evaluated for the position.9"
The procedure for appointing interim U.S. Attorneys has varied
over the years. "Since the civil war, [and until recently] the judiciary
ha[d] been empowered to fill vacancies in the office of United States At-
torney."9' Then, in 1986, Congress enacted § 546(d) of Title 28 of the
United States Code. 92 That law authorized the Attorney General to "'ap-
point a United States Attorney for the district in which the office is
vacant' for 120 days." 93 Once the Attorney General's ability to appoint
expired, the statute provided that the chief judge of the district in which
the vacancy existed could appoint an attorney to serve until the vacancy
was filled through Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. 94
The constitutionality of this method of appointment was upheld in
United States v. Hilario.95 There, the First Circuit held that, although the
Attorney General's ability to appoint was limited to 120 days, the district
courts' ability to make interim appointments without a time limit seemed
"deliberate" and would "allow a judicial appointee to serve until the va-
cancy [was] filled, whenever that may be." 96 Furthermore, the court did
not find that "the vesting of appointive authority in the courts served to
undermine the integrity ' 97 of the Judicial Branch because the ability to
make such appointments would comport with other judicial functions
such as ensuring "the enforcement of the laws . . . [and] an effective ad-
,,98versarial process. Likewise, the court found that this judicial interim
89. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Dept. of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and
Firing of U.S. Attorneys?, Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General).
90. Id.
91. United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 1999).
92. "If an appointment expires under subsection (c)(2), the district court for such district may
appoint a United States attorney to serve until the vacancy is filled." 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (2006).
93. Gantt, 194 F.3d at 998 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 546(d)).
94. Id.
95. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2000). In Hilario, after the position of U.S. Attorney for the
District of Puerto Rico became vacant, the judges of that district appointed a new U.S. Attorney
because the President failed to do so. Id. at 21. After more than six years, the President had yet to
nominate a replacement. Id. Hilario had been indicted and moved to dismiss the charges against
him on the basis of challenging the interim attorney's authority. Id. A lower court granted the mo-
tion, reasoning that the interim attorney's tenure frustrated congressional intent. Id. The First Cir-
cuit disagreed, holding that the statutory language indicated that an interim appointee could serve
until the vacancy was filled. Id. at 29. Thus, the court held, the interim attorney's appointment and
continued service complied with the statutory scheme and principles of separation of powers. Id.
96. Id. at 23.
97. Dismissals of U.S. Attorneys: Hearing on H.R. 580 Before the Subcomm. On Commercial
and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th Cong., at 9 (2007) (statement of
T.J. Halstead, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service) [hereinafter Halstead, Dis-
missals].
98. Hilario, 218 F.3d at 27.
2008]
Seattle University Law Review
appointment authority would not encroach upon the powers of the Ex-
ecutive because the functioning of the U.S. government "rests on the as-
sumption that officers can be independent of their appointers."99 The
court reasoned that, as inferior officers of the Executive Branch, judicial
interim appointees maintain independence from the district courts be-
cause the courts lack both supervisory and removal powers and are un-
able to determine how the appointees will enforce laws.'00
Other legal challenges to the 1986 appointment procedure also
failed. For example, in United States v. Gantt,101 the defendant contested
the government's authority to prosecute him and seek a search
warrant for his hotel room. He based the contest on the grounds that the
appointment of the then-current U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of California by the judges of the Southern District of California pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) violated the Appointments Clause. 10 2  The
Ninth Circuit held that U.S. Attorneys are "inferior officers." Thus, their
appointment by the district court did not violate the Appointments
Clause. The Appointments Clause authorizes Congress to "vest the Ap-
pointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 10 3 The
Ninth Circuit held that, because U.S. Attorneys are classified as inferior
officers, "§ 546(d) passes constitutional muster."'
0 4
In March 2006, a provision of the Patriot Act Reauthorization dra-
matically altered the process for appointing interim U.S. Attorneys. In-
stead of authorizing judges to make appointments after the initial 120-
day period allotted to the Attorney General's designee, the new Act gave
the Attorney General the power to appoint interim U.S. Attorneys for an
unlimited period of time.'0 5 By doing so, the 2006 amendment essen-
tially permitted the Executive to bypass Senate confirmation. If the Ex-
ecutive has the authority to make endless interim appointments, there is
no pressure to nominate a permanent U.S. Attorney to go through the
confirmation process.10 6 This makes the likelihood of abuse and political
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. 194 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1999).
102. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
103. Id.
104. Gantt, 194 F.3d at 999 (explaining why U.S. Attorneys are classified as inferior rather
than principal officers).
105. See MANUAL, supra note 43, at § 3-2.160 (1997) (amended 2006).
105. See generally Susan Crabtree, Sampson in Hot Seat: Dems Want to Know Who Was Be-
hind Plan to Circumvent Senate, THE HILL, Mar. 28, 2007, available at http://thehill.com/leading-
the-news/sampson-in-hot-seat-dems-want-to-know-who-was-behind-plan-to-circumvent-senate-
2007-03-28.html.
106. See generally id.
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favoritism more than just a mere possibility. Rather, it creates an oppor-
tunity for the President to remove a U.S. Attorney midterm to disrupt an
ongoing investigation or prosecution or to fill the vacant position with a
political crony who can help the President pursue his or her own agenda.
Although it is difficult to pinpoint with certainty the exact motiva-
tion behind the change in the law, 107 it is clear that such a change had
been in the works for years. While working as a DOJ Trial Attorney,
Wiener advocated changes in the law that would increase the power of
the Attorney General over U.S. Attorneys. 0 8 Rather than focusing on the
importance of independence and neutrality for U.S. Attorneys, Wiener
advocated a system that would provide more national uniformity for fed-
eral law enforcement. 109 At a minimum, Wiener believed that a change
in the law was important to prevent judicial appointments of interim U.S.
Attorneys from undermining the institutional integrity of both judges and
U.S. Attorneys. He wrote that "[t]he appointment of U.S. Attorneys
ought to be left to the executive branch, with the advice and consent of
the Senate .... ."110
In support of his proposal, Wiener argued that the Supreme Court's
holding in Morrison v. Olson,111 which upheld the constitutionality of
judges having a role in appointing Independent Counsel, did not apply to
U.S. Attorneys because they were not truly inferior officers.1 12 Wiener
presented several arguments in support of his claim. First, he argued that
U.S. Attorneys, unlike Independent Counsel, could not be fired by a
higher Executive Branch official.' 13 Second, he argued that the authority
107. Situations like the following could have provided an impetus for a change in the law. In
South Dakota, a dispute began in 2005 when James McMahon resigned as U.S. Attorney. The DOJ
appointed Michelle Tapken to serve a limited term until it named Steven Mullins as interim U.S.
Attorney. Mullins was sworn in on the same day that Tapken resigned. Meanwhile, U.S. District
Judge Larry Piersol of Sioux Falls challenged Mullins's appointment because, two days before his
appointment, Piersol had signed an order appointing Mark Meierhenry as interim U.S. Attorney.
The result was that two different attorneys had been appointed to the same position, exemplifying
the jurisdictional struggles between the DOJ and the district courts. Kevin Woster, Legal Eagles
Tussle Over U.S. Attorney Appointment, THE RAPID CITY JOURNAL, Jan. 5, 2006, available at
http://www.rapidcityjoumal.com/articles/2006/0l /05/news/local/news02.txt.
108. See Wiener, supra note 5, at 443-44.
109. The move toward more DOJ control over U.S. Attorneys' Offices began with the Reagan
and George H.W. Bush Administrations. For example, in an effort to make charging decisions more
uniform, former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh directed federal prosecutors to charge the
most serious crime supported by the known facts. Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum to
All Justice Department Litigators (Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT. REP. 347, 347 (1994)
(directing federal prosecutor to charge most serious, readily provable offense or offenses consistent
with defendant's conduct).
110. Wiener, supra note 5, at 446.
111. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
112. Wiener, supra note 4, at 411.
113. Id. at 408.
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of Independent Counsel is more limited than that of U.S. Attorneys.1 14
While Independent Counsel are appointed to investigate the alleged
commission of certain crimes, U.S. Attorneys are free to investigate a
wide array of crimes and suspects. U.S. Attorneys can also formulate
policy for their individual offices. Third, Wiener argued that Independ-
ent Counsel have limited jurisdiction for their investigation." 5 Finally,
Wiener argued that Independent Counsel have only a single task and that
their tenure ends when they complete that particular task.' 
16
No court, however, has agreed with Wiener's assessment of the dif-
ferences between U.S. Attorneys and Independent Counsel.' 17 Moreover,
since the time of his article, it appears that U.S. Attorneys have enjoyed
less freedom and discretion than what Wiener described. 18 If anything,
Wiener's discussion supports an argument that, while U.S. Attorneys are
technically "inferior" officers because they rely on the Attorney General
and DOJ for resources and certain policy directives, they should have
more independence and discretion than other types of "inferior" officers.
Ultimately, the courts will have to decide whether Wiener was cor-
rect in claiming that U.S. Attorneys are principal, rather than inferior,
officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause. Acknowledging this,
Wiener assumed in the second half of his article that U.S. Attorneys are
inferior officers and that "a literal reading of the Excepting Clause per-
mits [U.S. Attorneys'] appointment by courts of law." 119  He argued,
however, that for policy reasons, 120 judges should not have a role in the
114. Id.
115. Id. at 409.
116. Id. at 410.
117. See United States. v. Sotomayor Vazquez, 69 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289-91 (D.P.R. 1999). See
generally United States v. Cortes, 97 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Edmonds v. United States, 520
U.S. 651(1997).
118. Wiener describes the U.S. Attorneys as generally unsupervised:
U.S. Attorneys do not seek approval to initiate investigations, file indictments, enter plea
bargains, or prosecute cases at trial, nor is any such approval required. They do not seek
permission from, or even inform, a supervisor who is ultimately responsible to the Attor-
ney General. In many instances, Main Justice is not even aware of criminal prosecutions.
The Attorney General's immediate subordinates in Washington, D.C. are only likely to
become aware of and involved in a case when there is a problem or negative publicity.
Wiener, supra note 4, at 421 (footnotes omitted). In a recent hearing, David Igelesias, a former U.S.
Attorney, claimed that he felt political pressure to issue an indictment on local Democratic officials.
Hearing on the Dismissal of US. Attorneys, Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law
of the H. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of David Iglesias, U.S. Attorney for the
district of New Mexico). Other U.S. Attorneys have recently testified the Justice Department has
been trying to micromanage the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and their cases.
119. Wiener, supra note 4, at 423 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Wiener presented two main policy rationales in support of his argument that courts of law
should not appoint interim U.S. Attorneys. First, he contended that "[clourt appointment of U.S.
Attorneys .. .threatens to undermine judicial impartiality, and the appearance of impartiality, by
thrusting courts into partisan, political battles." Wiener, supra note 4, at 426 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 31:297
Interim Appointments of U.S. Attorneys
appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys. He contended that the Executive
Branch should exclusively control such appointments. 121  Wiener
claimed that court appointment of U.S. Attorneys threaten judicial impar-
tiality and violate principles of separation of powers.
Six years and one major scandal later, it has become clear that the
greater threat to the integrity of U.S. Attorneys comes not from the
courts' involvement in interim appointments, but instead from the un-
checked power of the Executive Branch to make interim appointments.
There have been relatively few complaints about judges' involvement in
the interim appointment process. 122  By contrast, recent events demon-
strate how the Executive Branch can politicize the process and under-
mine the critical work of U.S. Attorneys.
A. Can Judges Remain Neutral and Make Interim Appointments?
Wiener warned that an irreconcilable conflict of interest is created
when judges participate in the appointment of a U.S. Attorney because
prosecutors appear regularly before the court. 123 He warned that "[t]he
courts should reject the court appointment of U.S. Attorneys because it
'risks politicizing the judiciary.' ' 124  Indeed, once the recent scandal
erupted, DOJ officials submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee ex-
amples of problems in the courts' appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys.
Accordingly, in several situations, the court declined to make interim
appointments. 25 In one situation, the judge declined to do so because the
Next, Wiener claimed that court appointment of U.S. Attorneys sacrifices prosecutorial accountabil-
ity because "[d]efendants can hardly be expected to hold the court responsible for a bad appoint-
ment, at least not on the record." Wiener, supra note 4, at 431-32. This, Wiener argued, effectively
leaves defendants with "no one to blame" for wrongful appointments: "Who wants to tell a judge
that his or her appointee has acted improperly?" Wiener, supra note 4, at 432.
121. Wiener, supra note 4, at 446.
122. In addition to Wiener, others who have criticized the interim appointment process include
Justice Scalia, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 729-31, (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Akhil
Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 809-10 (1999).
123. Wiener wrote:
[D]istrict judges must consider the cases and controversies brought before them by the
very U.S. Attorney whom they have selected. Asking judges to choose the prosecutor
of their liking requires the judges to step outside their traditional role of impartiality.
Yet this impartiality is the single greatest asset of the judiciary-conferring on courts
their legitimacy and the standing that courts enjoy as the accepted arbiter ofjustice.
Wiener, supra note 4, at 431.
124. Wiener, supra note 4, at 431.
125. For example, since 2001, the Southern District of Florida, Eastern District of Oklahoma,
and Western District of Virginia have declined to exercise their appointment authority, instead al-
lowing the Attorney General to make interim appointments. See E-mail from Monica Goodling to
Richard Hertling, Nancy Scott-Finan, Kyle Sampson, Michael Elston, ODAG, William Moschella,
and John Nowacki, USAEO, Examples of Difficult Transition Situations (Feb. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/graphics/ustice-documents/070427-dojdocs-set3.pdf.
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DOJ would not provide the court with background information on the
potential candidates. 126 In what the DOJ officials claimed was the most
egregious situation, the Chief Judge in South Dakota sought to appoint
someone who the DOJ felt was unqualified. To bypass the court's deci-
sion, the Attorney General asked the career prosecutor filling the interim
appointment to resign so that the Attorney General could have another
120-day appointment without the court's involvement. The result was
that two individuals had seemingly been appointed by two different au-
thorities.
Even DOJ officials have to admit, however, that such problems
with judicial involvement in appointments are relatively rare. In general,
there are good reasons to believe that judges will generally appoint quali-
fied and respected individuals to an interim position. First, judges have
made hundreds of interim appointments; the DOJ has disagreed with the
courts' choices only a handful of times. By and large, judges appoint the
First Assistant in the office-an individual often designated by the
DOJ-as interim U.S. Attorney. Second, the chief judge of a district has
a very good idea of the capabilities and reputations of lawyers in the
judge's district. With that experience and information, judges are gener-
ally in an excellent position to appoint individuals who will be respected
by the courts and other prosecutors. Third, judges realize that their ap-
pointment power is only temporary. At any time, the Executive Branch
may nominate and seek confirmation of another individual. Judges have
no illusion that they will start controlling the prosecutors in their district
by the appointment of a temporary head of the office. Moreover, if there
is a concern that judges will show favoritism to U.S. Attorneys whom
they have appointed, judicial recusal rules would provide added protec-
tion for defendants. 
127
In 1987 a judge held as valid an appointment by the Attorney General where the court had declined
to make an appointment. See id.
126. When a vacancy opened up in the Southem District of Florida in 2005, former Attorney
General Gonzales appointed Alex Acosta, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division,
for 120 days. Id. At the end of Acosta's term, the Court indicated that it had previously appointed
an individual who turned out to be controversial and that it would not make an appointment unless
the DOJ turned over its internal employee files and FBI background reports so that the court could
review the potential candidates' backgrounds. Id. The DOJ refused to do so on the ground that the
materials were protected under federal law. Id. Subsequently, the Court indicated that it would not
make an appointment at all and that the Attorney General should continue to make successive 120-
day appointments. Id. The Attorney General made three successive 120-day appointments of
Acosta until Acosta was selected, nominated, and confirmed for the position. Id.
127. Before performing their judicial duties, federal judges must take an oath of impartiality
and affirm that they will administer justice faithfully and impartially. Federal judges must avoid bias
in all situations to be able to perform their duties impartially. The Code of Conduct for United
States Judges governs the conduct of all federal judges. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES
JUDGES Intro. (2004). In addition, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct sets forth standards for the
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The Supreme Court addressed concerns about judges' impartiality
in Morrison v. Olson.128 It held that "a judge's role in appointing an in-
dependent counsel did not threaten the impartial adjudication of cases,
given that the judges in question had no authority to review the actions of
the independent counsel and were disqualified from participating in any
such related judicial proceedings. 129 It further found that judicial ap-
pointment of independent counsel was in fact consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, since such authority would be improper only "if
there was some 'incongruity' between the functions normally performed
by the courts and the performance of their duty to appoint."' 3 ° In fact,
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "in light of judicial experience with
prosecutors in criminal cases, it could be said that courts are especially
well qualified to appoint prosecutors."'
131
As the Supreme Court has recognized, judges are both capable and
constitutionally permitted to be involved in the appointment of prosecu-
tors, under limited circumstances. The real question is whether their in-
volvement offers advantages over a scheme that relies solely on the Ex-
ecutive Branch to make interim appointments.
ethical conduct ofjudges. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
pmbl. (1990), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/home.html. Many jurisdictions have
adopted its various provisions. See, e.g., ILL. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT S. CT. RULE 63, Canon 3
cmt. Both codes set forth a general standard of disqualification in situations where the judge's im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES
Canon 3(C)-(D); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E). In addition, the United States
Code sets forth standards regarding the recusal of federal judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). Sec-
tion 455 sets forth situations in which federal judges must disqualify themselves. Id. § 455(a)-(b).
These situations include those in which a judge has "a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party," id. § 455(b)(1), or "a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding," id. § 455(b)(4). See Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS
L. J. 657, 661-74 (2005). Thus, in Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251 (5th
Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Riquelme Valdes v. Leisure Resource Group, Inc., 810
F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1987), the court held that, where one of the plaintiff's attorneys was a former law
clerk of the presiding judge and
had been exposed to the trial judge's innermost thoughts about the case, the trial judge
had no alternative to disqualifying himself. No matter how many assurances were given
•.. that the former law clerk would withdraw from the case.., the propriety of continu-
ing the proceedings before [the] judge had been irrevocably tainted and the impartiality
of the judge had been reasonably questioned.
Id. at 255. Consequently, the court remanded the case for a new trial before a different judge. Id. at
257.
128. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
129. Halstead, supra note 97.
130. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676.
131. Id. at 677 n.13.
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B. What Appointment Scheme Will Better Preserve Congress's
Role and Ensure U.S. Attorneys 'Independence?
Recent events have proven that political forces in the DOJ are a
much greater threat to the independence of U.S. Attorneys than judges
involved in the interim appointment process. Although the investigation
continues, preliminary indicators show that at least some U.S. Attorneys
were fired midterm so that interim appointments with greater political
allegiance to the President and with less controversial prosecutorial
agendas could be appointed in their place.
132
Moreover, the shift of interim appointment power from judges to
the Attorney General has been exposed for what it was-a scheme to
avoid congressional scrutiny in the appointment process. In early hear-
ings, then-Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty reassured senators
that "the Attorney General's appointment authority has not and will not
be used to circumvent the confirmation process."'133  However, soon
thereafter, an email surfaced, written by Kyle Sampson, Attorney Gen-
eral Alberto Gonzales's chief-of-staff, indicating that the new method of
appointment authorized by the Patriot Act Reauthorization was meant to
"give far less deference to home state senators and thereby get [the] pre-
ferred person appointed... far faster and more efficiently at less political
costs to the White House."'' 34 Such reference to getting the "preferred"
person into a position of great power indicated a startling intent to bypass
the system of checks and balances called for by the Constitution. An-
other email evidenced the Administration's desire to "'gum this to death'
and otherwise 'run out the clock' in an effort to avoid the confirmation
process to replace former U.S. Attorney Bud Cummins," one of the at-
torneys fired in the round of midterm firings.
135
These emails essentially affirm two things: (1) the change in the in-
terim appointment law politicized the process more than any judicial ap-
pointment scheme had in the past; and (2) the new appointment protocol
132. See Mark Foliman, Inside Bush's Prosecutor Purge: Why Has the Administration Fired
U.S. Attorneys with Sterling Track Records? To Make Room for Its Political Loyalists, Critics Say,
and Exert Its Last Shred of Control, SALON.COM, Feb. 28, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/02/28/attomeys/index-np.html; see also Lipton & John-
son, supra note 73. See also Einstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 40, at 245 ("use of political
criteria and service in Washington in selecting U.S. Attorneys in the Bush Administration is un-
precedented in the modern era").
133. Editorial, A Story Unravels: A Hollow Promise of 'Accountability' in the Firing of U.S.
Attorneys, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2007, at A14.
134. Id.
135. Sen. Lincoln on Senate Floor: Bill Will Restore Constitutional Process of Confirming U.S.
Attorneys, US FED. NEWS, Mar. 19, 2007.
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was part of a concerted effort by the Attorney General to seize greater
control of U.S. Attorneys' Offices.
136
By shifting to an interim appointment process that allowed the At-
torney General to make indefinite interim appointments, the Executive
Branch was able to avoid congressional oversight over federal prosecu-
tors. The Senate could not perform its constitutional role of providing
advice and consent because there was no need for the President to ap-
point permanent U.S. Attorneys who would have to go through the con-
firmation process. 137  This change denied the public an opportunity to
assess whether replacement U.S. Attorneys were qualified to serve and
why they were being selected to replace their predecessors.' 38 Without
transparency, it is easy for political agendas to take hold and for the work
of U.S. Attorneys to be disrupted because they conflict with those agen-
das. An interim appointment process that limits the Executive Branch's
ability to evade the confirmation process better preserves Congress' role
in the appointment of U.S. Attorneys and provides greater assurance that
U.S. Attorneys who bring politically sensitive cases will not be penalized
if those cases conflict with the Administration's political agenda.
IV. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
As the investigations into the U.S. Attorney firings continue,1 39 it
has become apparent that members of Congress, on both sides of the
aisle, are concerned with the increased politicization of U.S. Attorneys'
136. Professor James Eisenstein has documented Department of Justice efforts "to exercise
greater supervisory control over decision-making by United States Attorneys in the field, with a
view to making federal prosecutive policy more uniform nationwide." EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 40, at 12.
137. Senator Russ Feingold emphasized the role of confirmation hearings in preventing the
overt politicization of U.S. Attorneys' Offices in his statement at the beginning of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee hearings on the firing of the eight U.S. Attorneys. Is the DOJPoliticizing the Hiring
and Firing of U.S. Attorneys: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Sen. Russ Feingold, Wisconsin). For an excellent discussion on the general role of
confirmation hearings, see William G. Ross, The Senate's Constitutional Role in Confirming Cabi-
net Nominee and Other Executive Officers, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1123 (1998).
138. Is the DOJ Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold, Wisconsin) ("I was
deeply troubled when I learned that a change made during the Patriot Act reauthorization process
allows the Justice Department to sidestep the confirmation process for U.S. Attorneys altogether.
There is simply no good reason why the Attorney General needs the power to make indefinite in-
terim appointments. When it exercises that power, whether intended or not, the Administration cuts
Congress, and in the case of my state, the people of Wisconsin, out of that process.").
139. Jerry Seper, Gonzales Battles Will Raise Mukasey Hurdles, THE WASH. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2007, at A5; Richard B. Schmitt, Mukasey Hearing Set to Proceed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at
AI0. See also McQuilken, supra note 14.
2008]
Seattle University Law Review
Offices. 140 The recent shift of appointment power from the judges to the
Executive Branch did not protect the integrity of U.S. Attorneys but in-
stead did just the opposite. Consequently, it is not surprising that Con-
gress moved to repeal the new provision by passing the Preserving
United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007. This Act restores the
previous appointment system of initial 120-day interim appointments by
the Attorney General, followed by judicial appointments until there can
be Senate confirmation of a permanent successor. In June 2007, Presi-
dent George W. Bush unenthusiastically signed the Act into law.
141
Thus, the initial step has been taken. The law has been changed
back so that the Attorney General cannot make indefinite interim ap-
pointments that will bypass congressional approval. But more needs to
be done. The critical issue, now, is what steps can and should be taken to
ensure that U.S. Attorneys have the proper independence to perform their
duties and to prevent the appointment process for interim U.S. Attorneys
from being used to politicize those offices.
First, instead of hit lists being drafted by young staffers, 142 transi-
tion reports for resigning U.S. Attorneys should be prepared by the At-
torney General. These reports should disclose the reasons for which the
U.S. Attorneys are being asked to resign, and how, if at all, those reasons
are performance-related. Although the President has the power to fire a
140. Members of Congress have expressed mistrust with the use of power by the DOJ, and
there is obvious concern that the dismissals of the U.S. Attorneys were politically motivated. Sena-
tor Charles Schumer (D-NY) stated that "[t]he latest revelations prove beyond any reasonable doubt
that there has been unprecedented breach of trust, abuse of power and misuse of the Justice Depart-
ment." Ari Shapiro, Gonzales Admits to Errors in Firing U.S. Attorneys, NPR, Mar. 13, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=8285957. Senator John Cornyn (R-
Tex), generally regarded as one of the White House's firmest allies, expressed concern regarding the
U.S. Attorneys controversy. He stated that he has known the Attorney General for a long time and
wants to give him a chance to "explain himself." Pierre Thomas, Jason Ryan & Theresa Cook,
Attorney General Responds to Questions Over Firings of U.S. Attorneys, ABC NEWS, Mar. 13, 2007,
available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=2946995&page=1. Illinois Senator and presi-
dential candidate Barack Obama expressed his concern with the political motivation surrounding the
U.S. Attorneys scandal: "I have long believed that Alberto Gonzales subverted justice to promote a
political agenda, so I am pleased that he has resigned today. The President needs to nominate an
attorney general who will be the people's lawyer, not the President's lawyer." Even Some Republi-
cans Happy About Gonzales Resignation, CNN, Aug. 29, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/08/27/gonzales.reax/index.html?iref-newssearch.
141. Dan Froomkin, No Pardon Anytime Soon, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 15, 2007, avail-
able at 2007 WLNR 11431630 (stating that although "[i]t seem[ed Bush] just [could not] bring
himself to sign [the Act]," he finally signed the bill on June 14, 2007).
142. See Dan Eggen & Carol D. Leonnig, Officials Describe Interference by Former
Gonzales Aide, WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, at A4; see also Paul Kiel, Goodling, Sampson
Attended Rove Political Briefing, TPM MUCKRAKER, Aug. 6, 2007,
http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/cats/usattorneys; Chitra Ragavan, Behind the Scenes of the
U.S. Attorney Firings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 13 2007, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/070313/13ticktock.htm.
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U.S. Attorney for no cause, Congress can do a better job in its advice and
consent role if it has an idea of the real reason why a particular replace-
ment is being sought.
Second, ethics rules barring political figures from trying to influ-
ence U.S. Attorneys in their charging decisions 143 should be strictly
enforced.' 44 As independent law enforcement officials, U.S. Attorneys
should be under no obligation to explain to any individual member of
Congress why they are pursuing, or not pursuing, a particular case.
145
Certainly, Congress can conduct hearings as part of its oversight
responsibilities, but formal oversight hearings will have much more
143. The Rules of both the House of Representatives and the Senate address the ethics of a
situation.
The House Rules state:
A Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner may not, with the intent to influence on
the basis of partisan political affiliation an employment decision or employment practice
of any private entity ... take or withhold, or offer or threaten to take or withhold, an offi-
cial act; or... influence, or offer or threaten to influence, the official act of another.
110TH CONGRESS, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. XXIII (14). See also 110TH
CONGRESS, RULES OF THE SENATE, Rules, R. XXXVII (conflicts of interest).
144. Strict enforcement of ethical rules will help ensure that politicians do not attempt to place
political pressure on U.S. Attorneys. For instance, former U.S. Attorney David Iglesias recently
alleged that Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) contacted him via telephone some time ago to inquire
about whether Iglesias was going to issue indictments in a high-profile corruption
investigation involving a Democrat in New Mexico. Michael Gisick, Group Seeks Probe of
Domenici Call to Iglesias, ALBEQUERQUE TRIBUNE, Mar. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.abqtrib.com/news/2007/mar/05/iglesias-too-slow-claims-domenici. According to Igle-
sias, Domenici asked whether the indictment would be filed "before November." Dan Eggen & Paul
Kane, Prosecutors Say They Felt Pressured, Threatened, Hill Republicans, Justice Dept. Cited,
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at Al. When Iglesias responded that it would not, Domenici stated,
"I'm very sorry to hear that," and hung up the phone. Id. Iglesias stated that he felt pressured by the
Senator's questioning and thought it to be wholly improper. See Michael Gisick, Group Seeks Probe
of Domenici Call to Iglesias, ALBEQUERQUE TRIBUNE, Mar. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.abqtrib.com/news/2007/mar/05/iglesias-too-slow-claims-domenici; see also Dan Eggen
& Paul Kane, Prosecutors Say They Felt Pressured, Threatened; Hill Republicans, Justice Dept.
Cited, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at Al. Iglesias was later part of the group of U.S. Attorneys who
were fired during the United States Attorneys scandal. In response, Senator Domenici initially de-
nied making the phone call but has since admitted to calling Iglesias to inquire about the investiga-
tion and to find out the time frame with regard to the corruption case. See Michael Gisick, Group
Seeks Probe of Domenici Call to Iglesias, ALBEQUERQUE TRIBUNE, Mar. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.abqtrib.com/news/2007/mar/05/iglesias-too-slow-claims-domenici; see also Dan Eggen
& Paul Kane, Prosecutors Say They Felt Pressured, Threatened; Hill Republicans, Justice Dept.
Cited, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at Al.
145. As former Attorney General Robert Jackson once wrote,
One of the greatest difficulties of the position of prosecutor is that he must pick his cases,
because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives com-
plaints .... What every prosecutor is practically required to do is to select the cases for
prosecution and to select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm
is the greatest, and the proof the most certain.
Robert Jackson, Attorney General of the United States, Address at Second Annual Conference of
United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 18.
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transparency and accountability than weekend calls to a U.S. Attorney's
home.
Third, the DOJ should be required to communicate to the court both
the needs of a particular U.S. Attorney's Office and the qualifications of
the potential interim appointees. 146  Because of privacy laws, 147 there
may be a need for Congress to pass new laws making internal employee
files and Federal Bureau of Investigation reports available to courts.
However, greater cooperation and openness in the process will make it
difficult for unqualified interim appointees to be named U.S. Attorney.
Ultimately, the debate boils down to what we want our U.S. Attor-
neys' Offices to be.
If they are to be professional law enforcement offices responding to
the needs of the citizens of their districts, they must be led by inde-
pendent professionals with the support of the Justice Department. If
and when they become mere rewards or resume builders for those in
the good graces of the Attorney General, they will quickly lose their
credibility and thus their ability to perform their jobs effectively.1
48
Moreover, "U.S. Attorneys' Offices which become-or are per-
ceived to have become-politicized will cease to attract the best and the
brightest ... lawyers [who are] committed to serving the public .. .
Further, replacing U.S. Attorneys with under-qualified political insiders
will "denigrate the work of hardworking and dedicated Assistant U.S.
Attorneys and undermine[] public confidence in the work of their of-
fices."' 5 °  Morale in U.S. Attorneys Offices will continue to remain
low. 1 as the ends of justice are thwarted by political agendas that have
no place in a system of justice founded on principles of fairness and
truth. In the end, those who will suffer the most will be those who have
the greatest stake in ensuring the fair and just administration of the laws:
146. As Ross Wiener noted in his article, even if it is not foolproof, "the practice of including
the district judge from the outset has been relatively successful in ensuring that the Attorney Gen-
eral's nominee is accepted by the district court .. " Wiener, supra note 4, at 400 n. 172.
147. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2007).
148. Levenson, Preserving Prosecutorial Independence, supra note 21.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Jerry Seper, Inspector Eyes Gonzales Testimony: Leahy 'Pleased' With Inquiry, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at A3; James Oliphant, Top Cop Must Serve Many Masters: Job Demands
Legal, Political, People Skills, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 28, 2007, at Zone C, 10; Lichtblau &
Shane, supra note 26. ("Many say [that former Attorney General Gonzales left] a Justice Department
that has been . . . weakened by sapped morale."); Editorial, Attorney Firings Taint System Across
Nation; Our Turn, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 22, 2007, at 6B (stating that some attorneys
believe that "the controversy over the firings of the U.S. attorneys has tainted the justice system
throughout the country. It has hurt morale among U.S. attorneys, and has undermined their credibil-
ity ....").
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the American people. Thus, we must do everything in our collective
power to ensure that U.S. Attorneys are allowed to pursue rigorously the
ends of justice without fear of political retaliation and rebuke.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the founding of this nation, U.S. Attorneys have served as the
chief federal law enforcement officers for their districts. They owe their
allegiance to the people of their districts. 52 DOJ officials should start
thinking of U.S. Attorneys as more than just their elite handmaidens.
They are, in fact, the backbone of our federal criminal justice system.
The recent scandal involving the firing of U.S. Attorneys marks a
sad period for the DOJ. Prosecutorial credibility, especially that of for-
mer Attorney General Gonzales, has eroded much more than Ross Wie-
ner predicted judicial credibility would fall by having judges involved in
the appointment process. It may take years for people, including those in
the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, to believe officials in Main DOJ.
From a broader perspective, the scandal is consistent with percep-
tions that the Bush Administration has made concerted efforts to expand
and enhance the powers of the Executive Branch at the cost of reduced
public confidence in the Administration and government. Over the past
few years, these efforts have demoralized large segments of the Ameri-
can population and seriously diminished public confidence in the Ad-
ministration and the government.1 53 As the Administration approaches
the end of its reign, it can take some important steps toward restoring
public trust and confidence in the government. One such step would be
152. As Robert Jackson proclaimed many years ago,
[a] sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against the
abuse of power, and the citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with hu-
man kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional pur-
poses, and who approaches his task with humility.
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 6 (1940).
153. Recent opinion polls indicate that Americans' views on, and confidence in, the federal
government continue to wane. For instance, a Gallup Poll conducted in February 2007 indicates that
46% of Americans have little-to-no trust and confidence in the federal government with respect to
handling international problems, and 48% have little-to-no trust and confidence with respect to han-
dling domestic issues. Gallup Poll, Feb. 1-4, 2007, http://www.pollingreport.com/institut.htm. A
poll conducted in July 2007 shows that 71% of Americans believe that they can trust politicians in
Washington "to do what is right" "only some of the time." CBS News/New York Times Poll, July
9-17, 2007, http://www.pollingreport.com/institut.htm.
In addition, a recent CBS News Poll indicates that 69% of Americans disapprove of the way
President Bush is "handling the situation with Iraq," CBS News Poll, Aug. 8-12, 2007,
http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm, and the President's approval ratings continue to remain near
all-time lows, Pollingreport.com, Bush: Job Ratings, http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm
(displaying the President's approval ratings from a variety of different public opinion polls on Octo-
ber 24, 2007, over 60% of individuals polled disapproved of President Bush).
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full and candid disclosure of the criteria the Attorney General used to
terminate the fired U.S. Attorneys in 2006. Indeed, the American public
is entitled to that information. A more significant step, however, may be
a commitment by the DOJ to stop politicizing the work of U.S. Attor-
neys. 154 Such a commitment would not only assure U.S. Attorneys that
they may vigorously pursue the ends of justice without fear of political
rebuke but would also help restore some of the faith of the American
people in the government and the justice system.
Since the founding of this nation, U.S. Attorneys have served as the
chief federal law enforcement officers for their districts. They owe their
allegiance to the people of their districts. DOJ officials should stop
thinking of U.S. Attorneys as their elite personal staffers. They are, in
fact, the guardians of our federal criminal justice system.
154. Judge Michael B. Mukasey, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales' recently con-
firmed replacement, emphasized at his Senate confirmation hearing that he would try to remove
partisan politics from the Department of Justice by not allowing partisan politics to affect the cases
he brings or the prosecutors he hires. Richard B. Schmitt, Justice Nominee Pledges Reform, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at Al.
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